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 INVITED ARTICLE  
 
Happiness studies in ancient Greece? 





Abstract: Can the study of philosophy lead to happiness—whether after death, as Socrates 
claimed, in Plato’s dialogue ‚The Phaedo‛, or while one is still alive, as Epicurus, the Roman 
Stoics, and other ancient thinkers maintained? In his dialogue ‚Hermotimus or on Philosophical 
Schools‛, the second-century satirist Lucian of Samosata cast a skeptical eye on all such 
teachings. How can students know which of the many paths to happiness and wisdom to 
choose, which guide to trust? Might signing on with any one teacher be a waste of time? What if 
some are charlatans who not only fail to provide a path to happiness but actually mislead and 
profiteer from their hapless charges? I argue that Lucian’s cautionary attitude is equally useful 
today for anyone confronted with the profusion of courses, books and websites offering help in 
finding or ‘choosing’ happiness. I would now wish to include his irreverent voice among the 
many that I found helpful in writing Exploring Happiness: From Aristotle to Brain Science. But I 
would hope to invite him, in turn, to go beyond his skeptical approach and reach also for the 
sympathetic understanding of different experiences and perspectives needed to deepen one’s 
understanding of happiness. 
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   
 
Socrates: Those who are found to have excelled in holy living are freed from 
these regions within the earth [Hades] and are released as if from prisons; they 
mount upward into their pure abode and dwell upon the earth. And of these, all 
who have duly purified themselves by philosophy live henceforth altogether 
without bodies, and pass to still more beautiful abodes. 
– Plato , ‚The Phaedo‛1 
 
Cerberus: When Socrates had peeped into the chasm [of Hades], and seen the 
darkness, and I had bitten him and dragged him by the foot, because he was still 
slowed down by the hemlock, he shrieked like an infant, and cried for his 
children, and went frantic. < Then [when he could see that his fate was 
inescapable] he put on a bold front, pretending he would be glad to accept what  
  
                                               
1 Plato, ‚Phaedo‛ in Plato, vol. I, Euthypro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, tr. Harold North Fowler (Loeb 
Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1971), 391. 




was quite inevitable, all to win the admiration of the onlookers. 
 – Lucian, Dialogues of the Dead2 
 
Can the study of philosophy lead to happiness—whether after death, as Socrates claimed, in 
Plato’s dialogue ‚The Phaedo‛, or while one is still alive, as Epicurus, the Roman Stoics, and 
other ancient thinkers maintained? True, teachers in the different schools proposed 
incompatible visions of happiness to students and followers; this only showed how important 
it was not to be led astray by erroneous doctrines. By contrast, Lucian of Samosata cast a 
skeptical eye on all such hopes in works such as his Dialogues of the Dead or Philosophers for Sale. 
An itinerant lecturer, born in Syria around AD 125, Lucian presented satires and dialogues in 
public performances throughout the Roman Empire. He delighted in needling philosophers for 
their high-flown discourse, which masked what he saw as the hypocrisy with which they could 
enlist the gullible in their schools.  
Many in Lucian’s audiences were highly educated and thoroughly familiar with Greek 
mythology and schools of philosophy. The scathing familiarity with which he portrayed 
philosophers and the adepts who slavishly imbibed their views could seem disrespectful to 
traditionalists even as they admired the humor and the elegant brevity of his writings. It is hard 
to exaggerate the contrast that Lucian’s listeners must have found between his evocation of 
Socrates’ distraught arrival in the gloomy realm of the dead and Plato’s famous account of his 
high hopes for a blissful existence in afterlife in the company of gods and the noblest of 
humans.  
Lucian knew the competing philosophical schools well, having spent several years in 
Athens in his youth. He may have traveled there in a spirit of inquiry—a self-taught man from 
the provinces seeking answers in the legendary city, still the intellectual center of the Western 
world, where Plato and Aristotle and Epicurus had once taught, and where their successors, 
along with Pythagoreans, Stoics, and others held forth to students of all ages. But Lucian had 
found precious little agreement on questions about the pursuit of happiness, the nature of 
virtue, and how best to lead one’s life to link the two. He had looked in vain for wisdom and 
guidance, whether in the gatherings where Stoic philosophers taught under the covered 
porticos near the Academy that Plato had founded; among the Platonists discoursing in that 
Academy; listening to Aristotle’s successors in the Lyceum; puzzling over mystical teachings 
by Pythagoreans and mystics; or visiting the world-famous Garden that Epicurus had created 
hundreds of years before, still piously maintained by Epicureans who resided there.  
It would be only natural for someone coming from the provinces to Athens and witnessing 
the disputes among teachers of philosophy to feel bewildered at first. How, confronted with 
such incompatible doctrines, can one know which path to happiness and wisdom to choose, 
which guide to trust? Might signing on with any one teacher be a waste of time? What if some 
are charlatans who not only fail to provide a path to happiness but actually mislead and 
profiteer from their hapless charges?  
These are the questions that Lucian raises in his dialogue ‚Hermotimus, or on Philosophical 
Schools‛—questions as important for students of happiness in our time as in his. 3  In this 
                                               
2 Lucian, ‚Dialogues of the Dead” in Lucian, tr. M. D. Macleod, vol. VII (Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University 
Press, 1961), Dialogue 4, 21. 
3 Lucian, ‚Hermotimus or on Philosophical Schools,‛ in C. D. N. Costa, tr., Lucian: Selected Dialogues (Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 88-9. See also ‚Hermotimes or Concerning the Sects,‛ tr. A. M. Harmon, in Lucian (Loeb 
Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1915), vol. V, 260-415; and a recent French translation by Jean-Paul 
Dumont, Hermotime: Ou comment choisir sa philosophie (Presses Universitaires de France, 1993). I have drawn on all 




dialogue, Lycinus, a stand-in for Lucian himself, challenges an old man, exhausted from twenty 
years spent as the disciple of a Stoic teacher, yet still hoping to attain the heights where he has 
been told he will find happiness, virtue, and wisdom. When Lycinus suggests that the goal 
must surely be in sight after such long efforts, Hermotimus wistfully admits that, so far, he has 
nothing to show for his exertions. Why, then, should he have continued studying philosophy 
for so long? Hermotimus answers that he must persevere: ‚philosophy is unattainable even if 
you spend a long time over it unless you keep your gaze fixed intently on it; and the stakes are 
high—whether to perish miserably among the populace or to win happiness through 
philosophy.‛4  
But with the stakes so high and the journey so long and arduous, it must be crucial to know 
that one has signed on with the right guide. Why choose one path rather than another? After 
all, Stoics were far from the only teachers holding out promises of happiness to those who 
studied their doctrines. Lycinus presses Hermotimus to explain how he came to choose to 
follow his Stoic teacher in the first place, given that Platonists, Epicureans, Peripatetics, 
Pythagoreans, and others were also inviting followers: 
When you first began to study philosophy, and there were many doors open to 
you, you passed by the others and came to the Stoic door which you entered on 
your way to virtue, believing it was the one true door which opened up the 
straight path, while the others led to blind alleys. What made you believe this? 
What signs guided you?5  
All the reasons that Hermotimus advances—that he saw most people taking the Stoics’ path, 
that the Stoic teachers inspired him with hope for finding the happiness he sought, that many 
said they were manly and understood everything, that he admired watching them, with their 
dignified way of walking, their neat dress and thoughtful expressions—Lycinus promptly 
demolishes. Suppose, he asks, that he himself had chosen the path Hermotimus had taken, 
trusting him as a friend, only to find that some god had brought back to life Plato, Pythagoras, 
Aristotle and other thinkers. What if they asked him to explain his reasons for esteeming the 
Stoics more highly than them, ‚not giving us a chance to speak and not testing any of our 
claims‛? Merely to answer that his friend Hermotimus had told him to choose the Stoics would 
be worthless, in the absence of carefully comparing the arguments and deciding what is true 
and what is false. But such comparisons would take a great deal of time, if carefully entered 
into. They would preclude merely deciding on the Stoics’ path, as Hermotimus had done. 
Hermotimus agrees that such comparisons would ordinarily be indispensable; it is just that, 
in this case, the Stoics speak the truth. If someone tells you that two plus two makes five, this 
would be false ‚even if countless Platos and Pythagorases say so.‛ In the same way, one can 
learn the truth from the Stoics without checking other creeds. Well, counters Lycinus, but does 
he not have to admit that all the philosophers who disagree about philosophical issues do agree 
that two and two makes four; but that comparing conflicting arguments and conclusions is 
precisely what he has to accept as necessary before deciding on one and only one path to 
happiness? And yet, devoting enough time to the philosophical schools might take more than a 
                                                                                                                                                      
three translations in quoting this dialogue. All three titles combine to convey the meaning of the Greek ‚haireseon‛ 
which carries meanings of ‚sects,‛ ‚schools‛ and also ‚choices.‛ Choosing among the sects or schools could involve, 
as in this dialogue, choosing a philosophy. 
4Lucian, ‚Hermotimus or on Philosophical Schools,‛ in C. D. N. Costa, tr., Lucian: Selected Dialogues (Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 88. 
5 Ibid., 94. 




lifetime, Lycinus facetiously adds: even if one were to restrict the number of schools to ten and 
devote twenty years to learning the doctrines of each, it would add up to two hundred years.  
When Hermotimus is driven to reply that he simply cannot give adequate reasons for his 
choice, he has to consider, once again, the questions Lycinus first put to him: why is he still 
carrying on with his philosophical studies, day after exhausting day? Might he in fact be 
wasting his life in a fruitless quest? Barking up the wrong tree? Distraught, he finally agrees: ‚I 
am grieving for all the time I’ve been fool enough to waste, and, what’s more, the high fees my 
labors have cost me.‛6  He thanks Lycinas for having pulled him out when he was being 
whirled about by a rough and turbid torrent, abandoning himself to being carried along by the 
stream. From a true believer, he has turned into a doubter of all faiths. He hates not just his 
teacher, not just Stoicism, but all philosophical creeds. ‚And if I ever again, even 
unintentionally, meet a philosopher as I am walking on the road, I’ll turn around and avoid 
him like a mad dog.‛  
The Hermotimus dialogue expresses the perplexity many experience when meeting up 
with individuals fervently convinced of extraordinarily different and often incompatible 
philosophical views; and in turn with teachers and gurus promoting disparate paths to virtue, 
wisdom, and happiness. The experience of wonderment for outsiders at coming face to face 
with multiple belief systems promising insight and happiness after often lengthy studies has 
rarely been more tellingly conveyed. How, given so many avenues to hoped-for happiness, do 
people end up pursuing this or that particular doctrine? As Lycinus explained to Hermotimes, 
it would be folly simply to embark on any one path with any one teacher or doctrine, before 
comparing the arguments made by each.  
Lucian’s skeptical challenges to the competing philosophical sects and his critique of 
hypocrisy and greed among those offering guidance to the gullible resonated in later ages. 
Erasmus praised him as ‚the adamantine persecutor of all superstition‛ even as Martin Luther, 
among Protestants, and Roman Catholic inquisitors alike excoriated him for his irreverent 
treatment of deities, heroes, and philosophers. 
Lucian’s cautionary attitude might be equally useful today for anyone confronted with the 
profusion of courses, books and websites offering help in finding or ‚choosing‛ happiness. 
Why not, he might ask those seeking paths to happiness, much as Lycinus advised 
Hermotimus, stop to compare the various approaches to happiness and scrutinize the evidence 
their sponsors offer? Why not probe, also, any vested interest some of the latter may have in 
enlisting as many followers as possible?  
I took special pleasure, while writing Exploring Happiness: From Aristotle to Brain Science, in 
exploring different lines of study as if I were in the company of individuals engaged in the 
same pursuits. I would now wish to include Lucian among the many that I found helpful in 
that regard. He might well be fascinated by the rich scientific resources now becoming 
available for happiness studies, in fields such as psychology, economics, health care, genetics, 
and the brain sciences. His skeptical questioning of claims about happiness is as needed today 
as in his time; but I would hope to invite him, in turn, to reach also for that sympathetic 
understanding of different experiences and perspectives needed to deepen one’s understanding 
of happiness.  
In my book, I aimed to bring together the striking new results from research by natural and 
social scientists with long-standing traditions of reflection by philosophers, religious thinkers, 
historians, poets, and others about happiness. Lucian’s irreverent attitude toward the latter 
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would have served as one more challenge in the effort to draw on both the past and the 
present, spanning the various disciplines. Taken together, these disciplines can contribute to a 
fuller, deeper understanding of the scope of happiness, even as some among them can 
challenge and point to shallowness, tunnel vision, or errors in others. Examining divergent 
conceptions of happiness side by side, I suggested, would allow us both to fathom their 
richness and to weigh the clashing arguments about what contributes to it or detracts from it, 
how it might be defined and measured, and how it relates to income, say, or to temperament, 
sociability, marriage, or religious faith.  
Against this background, I wanted to consider perennial moral issues about how we should 
lead our lives and how we should treat one another. What are the wisest steps to take in the 
pursuit of happiness? What moral considerations should set limits to such pursuits? What else 
should matter in human lives aside from happiness? These issues are no different from those 
debated by the thinkers Lucian had studied in Athens and met during his peregrinations; but 
some are now more sharply etched in the light of new information and the advent of modern 
media: How should we weigh our own happiness against that of others in a world where we 
are aware, as never before, of extremes of misery and opulence? How might we best take into 
account what we are learning about the effects of our individual and collective choices on the 
prospects for the wellbeing of future generations?  
Bypassing such issues makes it all the easier to give short shrift to assumptions that form 
the subtext to even the most innocuous-seeming views of happiness. These assumptions, 
familiar in philosophy and political science, concern power—power exerted or defended 
against, whether in families, communities, or political and religious institutions. Often 
unspoken, these assumptions are about who has the right to pursue his or her own happiness, 
who does and does not deserve happiness, and whether the happiness of some may require the 
exclusion or exploitation of others. They resonate in debates over authority and obedience, 
control and resistance, duties and rights, allegiance and independence. Today, conflicts over 
them are playing out on a far larger stage than ever before, reaching billions of individuals 
across the globe, their fortunes affected by global economic shifts beyond their control, their 
hopes fanned by mass media promotion of methods for achieving happiness in daily life or for 
finding the path to eternal bliss. 
To refocus attention on the moral dimensions of the pursuit of happiness, I asked, 
throughout my book, what I call ‚Yes but‛ questions in the face of claims that a particular 
action or personality trait or belief or way of life will bring greater happiness. Some of these 
questions are of an empirical nature, requesting evidence to support the claims or voicing 
caution in the face of their frequently cheery, upbeat appeal. Others are of a moral nature, 
asking whether it would be right to seek the kind of happiness held out as desirable or to enjoy 
it, once it was achieved. Will pursuing such happiness involve us in deceit? Will it require that 
we break a promise? Is it cruel, unjust, exploitative? Does it call for us to blind ourselves to 
needs we would otherwise feel duty-bound to address? Stepping back to ask such questions 
creates space for reflection, for seeking to perceive more fully and to deliberate more attentively 
in the face of the many conflicting claims about what happiness is and how it should be 
pursued—precisely the approach that Lucian proposed to Hermotimes. 
I likened efforts to achieve such understanding to the journeys undertaken in the myths 
and folk tales by young persons setting out to seek their fortune. They have no assurance of 
success, no assurance that happiness is owed to them. They have to traverse unknown regions, 
encounter seductive lures, take high-stakes risks, sometimes come back empty-handed. They 
must find the right balance between empathy and resilience—between fellow-feeling and self-




protection—as they learn to perceive the humanity and the urgent needs of many a strange-
looking creature, while remaining wary of all who claim to know the one and only path to 
happiness. 
Just as the seekers in myths and folk tales need more than a little luck in order not to 
emerge empty-handed, so does anyone exploring the role of happiness. Even as those seekers 
benefit from combining sympathetic understanding with a dose of healthy skepticism, so do 
those who venture into the jungle of claims and counterclaims about happiness, especially 
when they meet up with conflicting appeals by religious, political, and other authorities to set 
aside all misgivings and place faith in their dictates. Finding the right balance between 
empathy and resilience matters as much for the study of happiness as for those engaged in its 
pursuit. 
Resilience, unless it is accompanied by empathy, helps shut out full awareness of the needs 
of others. A measure of individual resilience is necessary for sheer survival; but people also 
need empathy to thrive in the company of others, beginning with families. Both resilience and 
empathy are present in rudimentary form early in human life at the neurological level. Both can 
be nurtured, strengthened, or on the contrary neglected, stunted, even completely eroded 
through misfortune and abuse. And the erosion of one can debilitate the other: those who 
become more fearful, say after witnessing or enduring violence, can adapt by become less 
caring, sometimes taking vicarious or active pleasure in maiming and killing—exhibiting a 
form of what I have called, elsewhere, ‚learned pitilessness.‛7 
The more I have had a chance to study the clashing views about happiness and the 
passionate advocacy the subject can inspire, the more intrigued I have become with the voices 
of the thinkers who have embarked on a similar study. In listening to them, I have been struck 
by the difference between persons so sure of their convictions that they block off all dialogue, at 
times attempt to silence all critics, and those who, like Lucian, relish dialogues with friends and 
adversaries, present and past—and who, in so doing, invite the rest of us to strive to reach 
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